Workplace Violence & Bullying: The Union’s Rights and Responsibilities

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INTRODUCTION

Violence and bullying in the workplace are not new phenomena. However, in recent years much attention has been paid to workplace violence and bullying and the problems they pose for employees and employers alike. In the unionized workplace, there is, of course, another party involved: the union. This paper addresses some of the union’s rights and responsibilities with regard to issues related to workplace violence and bullying.

Part One recaps the union’s quasi-statutory duty to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit. This duty pervades much of what the union does, and would be implicated by the union’s decision to pursue or not pursue a contractual grievance on behalf of an employee involved in workplace violence or bullying.

Part Two addresses whether and to what extent collective bargaining agreements may govern workplace violence and bullying. In the context of the grievance and arbitration procedure, what is the union’s obligation to bargaining unit employees who claim to have been victimized by violent or abusive behavior on the job, and what are the potential contractual bases for pursuing a grievance on behalf of those employees? What about when an employee has been disciplined or discharged by the employer for allegedly acting in a violent or abusive manner toward management or co-workers? This part also considers the potentially challenging situation where both the alleged victim and aggressor are members of the bargaining unit.

Part Three assesses when the conduct of violent or abusive supervisors rises to the level of an unfair labor practice under by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and also when ostensibly abusive or threatening employee conduct is protected by the NLRA (and when it is not).

Part Four considers several ways in which the employer’s implementation of work rules and policies aimed at curtailing workplace violence and bullying

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implicates the NLRA; namely, the employer's duty to bargain with the union, and employees' right to engage in protected concerted activity.

I. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION: AN OVERVIEW

A. Source and Scope of the Duty

There is no explicit statutory provision stating that unions have a duty of fair representation. However, Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that representatives of a bargaining unit "shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . ." Courts have held that a necessary corollary to a union's role as the “exclusive representative” of members of a bargaining unit is “the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts.”

The union's duty extends to all represented employees, i.e., all employees in the applicable bargaining unit. This includes union members as well as non-members. It is important to recognize that the duty arises not from internal union rules governing obligations to members, but from Section 9(a) which establishes the union's role of “exclusive representative” of the entire bargaining unit.

The union's duty is limited, however, to matters involving the collective bargaining relationship. In other words, “the duty of fair representation arises only when the union, the employee, and the employer are involved.” “Consequently, a matter that involves only the relationship between the union and its members and does not also involve the employer is viewed as an internal matter that does not give rise to a duty of fair representation.”

B. Nature of the Duty

To fulfill its duty of fair representation, a union must not engage in conduct toward members of the bargaining unit that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Conduct is discriminatory if it is based on irrelevant and invidious

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7 Price, 795 F.2d at 1134.
distinctions.\textsuperscript{9} This would include distinctions based on an employee’s status as a nonmember or political rival, or on the employee’s race, religion, gender, national origin, or other protected trait.\textsuperscript{10} Importantly, unions may not discriminate in their representation of employees on the basis of disability, including mental illnesses. Indeed, the anti-discrimination provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 \textit{et seq.} expressly applies to unions in their capacity as employers and also in their capacity as labor organizations.

Bad faith conduct is that which involves fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or improper motives.\textsuperscript{11} This might include intentionally misleading employees as to their contractual rights or deadlines for filing grievances, or refusing to process a grievance because of personal animosity. Even if a union decides to pursue a grievance, a violation may occur if it does so in a “perfunctory, apathetic, indifferent and cursory way approaching the level of bad faith.”\textsuperscript{12}

Determining whether union conduct is so arbitrary that it rises to the level of a breach of the duty of fair representation is a fact-sensitive inquiry, and thus difficult to reduce to a clear and simple test. However, any doubts as to the arbitrariness of union conduct are usually resolved in favor of the union. According to the Supreme Court, a union’s actions are arbitrary “only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ as to be irrational.”\textsuperscript{13}

Ultimately, an employee has no absolute right to have his or her grievance taken to arbitration.\textsuperscript{14} As long as the union makes an adequate investigation into the facts, and its interpretation of the contract has some basis in reason, its decision as to whether to process the grievance will not be considered arbitrary or otherwise inconsistent with its duty of fair representation.

\section*{II. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE \& BULLYING AND THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT}

In a union shop, many of the rights and responsibilities of employees and management are governed by a collective bargaining agreement. While not every contract is the same, many labor agreements contain provisions which bear on issues of workplace violence and bullying. Further, most labor agreements contain

\textsuperscript{9} See Steele, 323 U.S. at 203.
\textsuperscript{10} See id.
\textsuperscript{12} See Webb \textit{v. ABF Fright Sys., Inc.}, 155 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 1998).
\textsuperscript{14} See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 194-95.
a grievance and arbitration mechanism through which alleged contract violations, including those related to violence in the workplace, are processed. Thus, whether the union’s obligation is to the alleged victim or the alleged aggressor, or both, the applicable collective bargaining agreement and its grievance and arbitration procedure may well play an important role in the resolution of the issue.

A. Pursuing a Contractual Grievance On Behalf of the Alleged Victim

In determining whether or not to pursue a grievance on behalf of an employee who complains that he or she has been the victim of violent or abusive behavior by a supervisor or a coworker, the union should conduct a reasonable investigation into the facts and review the collective bargaining agreement to determine which, if any, of its provisions apply to the conduct at issue. Below are several examples of contract clauses that might support a grievance in such situations.

1. “Health & Safety” or “Workplace Violence” Clauses

Historically, contract provisions concerning employee “health and safety” referred to the protection of life and limb for workers in physically dangerous lines of work. However, today many labor contracts contain broad provisions related to employee health and safety which may put a contractual onus on employers to deal with problems of violent and abusive workplace conduct.

Collective bargaining agreements may expressly address workplace violence and require that the employer take affirmative steps to maintain a healthy and safe work environment for employees. Below is a hypothetical example of a contract provision dealing with employee health and safety as well as workplace violence and threats of violence:

_The employer is committed to employee health and safety. Workplace violence, including threats of violence by or against an employee, will not be tolerated and should be immediately reported whether or not physical injury occurs._

Notably, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration considers (at least informally) workplace violence to include threats of violence and verbal abuse.15 As such, depending on how broadly they are worded, contract provisions related to the employer’s obligation to maintain a healthy and safe work environment may provide a basis for pursuing a grievance.

3. “Mutual Respect” or “Anti-Bullying” Clauses

Depending on the union and industry, collective bargaining agreements may contain “mutual respect” or anti-bullying clauses. The inclusion of such clauses in labor agreements is more common in the service and health care industries, rather than in the construction trades, for example, but there appears to be a growing trend in favor of such contract language in those areas. For instance, here is a sample “mutual respect” clause based on contract language negotiated by the Service Employees International Union/National Association of Government Employees (“SEIU/NAGE”):

Behaviors that contribute to a hostile, humiliating or intimidating work environment, including abusive language or behavior, are unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Employees who believe they are subject to such behavior should raise their concerns with an appropriate manager or supervisor. In the event the employee’s concerns are not addressed internally within a reasonable period of time, the employee or the Union may file a grievance. Grievances filed under this section shall not be subject to the arbitration provisions set forth in this contract.

Contract provisions may go so far as to define and expressly prohibit “bullying,” such as this sample provision based on language from a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the Government Accountability Office Employees Organization, International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (“IFPTE”):

The parties will not tolerate bullying behavior, which is defined as repeated inappropriate behavior, either direct or indirect, whether verbal, physical, or otherwise, by one or more persons against another or others, at the place of work and/or in the course of employment. Examples of bullying could include: slandering, ridiculing or maligning a person or his or her family; persistent name calling which is hurtful, insulting or humiliating; using a person as a butt of jokes; abusive and offensive remarks.¹⁶

Such “mutual respect” or anti-bullying clauses would, of course, provide a fairly concrete basis for pursuing a grievance on behalf of an employee subjected to violent or abusive behavior in the workplace. Notably, however, contract provisions like the one from the SEIU/NAGE contract would foreclose the arbitration of grievances not resolved to the satisfaction of the union or the affected employee through internal processes.

¹⁶ A copy of the GAO Employees/IFTPE contract is available at http://gaoemployees.org/Downloads/Agreements/analystCBA.pdf.
In sum, each collective bargaining agreement is different because it reflects the different interests, values, and traditions of the signatory parties. Some unions may insist on the inclusion of clear rules prohibiting violent and abusive conduct, while others may avoid it out of fear that it would be used by the employer as a weapon against their members. In any event, in assessing whether to pursue a contractual grievance on behalf an alleged victim of violence or bullying, the union should carefully review the contract to determine whether there is a contractual basis for pursuing the matter.

B. Pursuing a Contractual Grievance on Behalf of the Alleged Aggressor

The union has a duty to fairly represent all bargaining unit employees, including employees who have been accused of engaging in acts of violence or threats of violence. In fact, in many industries it is a far more common scenario for the union to defend an alleged aggressor against discipline or discharge, than it is for the union to advocate on behalf of an alleged victim of such conduct. When an employer seeks to discipline or discharge an employee for engaging in violent or abusive conduct, the issue usually is whether the employer had “just cause” to do so.

Most collective bargaining agreements require that employers have “just cause” or “reasonable cause” before disciplining or discharging a bargaining unit employee. Such clauses, meant to protect employees from arbitrary employer action, are a pillar of the labor-management relationship. As one arbitrator put it:

[Just cause provisions] exclude discharge for mere whim or caprice. They are, obviously, intended to include those things for which employees have traditionally been fired. They include the traditional causes of discharge in the particular trade or industry, the practices which develop in the day-to-day relations of management and labor and most recently they include the decisions of courts and arbitrators. . . . They include such duties as honesty, punctuality, sobriety, or conversely, the right to discharge for theft, repeated absence of lateness, destructions of company property, brawling and the like. Where they are not expressed in posted rules, they may very well be implied, provided they are applied in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner.17

Discipline and discharge cases involving issues of just cause make up a substantial percentage of labor arbitrations. The conduct at issue in these cases varies widely, even within the realm of conduct that can be described as violent,

threatening, or abusive. So too do arbitrators’ decisions as to what employee conduct provides the employer with just cause to discipline or discharge. As such, it is not useful to survey the entire landscape of labor arbitration decisions in this area. However, there are some identifiable trends in the areas of violence and threats of violence in the workplace that merit discussion.

It is generally accepted that employers have a duty to protect their employees from violence and threats of violence in the workplace. Indeed, some would argue that recent arbitration decisions reflect a trend in favor of finding just cause where an employer seeks to remove employees who engage or threaten to engage in violent acts toward others. For example, threatening conduct and utterances directed toward co-workers likely would provide proper grounds for discipline where the recipient reasonably fears for his or her safety.

Of course, the context in which the threatening behavior occurs is highly relevant to the analysis. The more egregious the conduct or utterance, the more likely an arbitrator is to find that discipline is appropriate. Similarly, specific threats of imminent harm to another employee, if credible, may well provide just cause. On the other hand, if a reasonable person subjected to the same threats, under all the circumstances, would not believe harm might ensue, or where the actual response to the behavior does not reflect fear or concern, it is less likely that discipline will be deemed appropriate.

Employee conduct that is not particularly egregious or disturbing in nature, but that is part of a history of harassing behavior may give the employer just cause for discipline or discharge. In one case, an arbitrator found just cause despite acknowledging that “there was no direct threat shown to have been made by lifted arm or proffered weapon to or at any person. . . [and] even the wild and unseemly language used by the grievant, was couched in conditional language.” However, the arbitrator continued: “Out of context, taken separately, they may not have been immediate active threats . . . . [but] [t]he record is clear that the supervisors and the personnel manager felt a deep fear of this employee . . . . The grievant terrified these supervisors.” Thus, persistently abusive conduct, though not severe in nature, may provide sufficient grounds for discipline or discharge.

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18 See Discipline & Discharge in Arbitration at 348 (Brand, Biren eds. BNA Books 2008).
19 See id. at 350.
20 See id. at 350 (citing cases).
21 See id.
24 Id.
In considering whether to invoke the grievance-arbitration mechanism on behalf of a bargaining unit employee accused of violent or abusive conduct, the union should be mindful of these recent trends in the areas of workplace violence and threats of violence.

C. Representing Both the Alleged Victim and Aggressor

It is not uncommon for workplace violence and bullying to involve two or more bargaining unit employees with competing interests. The most obvious scenario is where the union represents both the alleged victim and the alleged aggressor. For obvious reasons, this can be an awkward situation for the union.

While lawyers are generally prohibited from representing two clients with competing interests, there is no analogous “conflict of interest” principle in the context of a union’s duty to fairly represent employees. In *Humphrey v. Moore*, the Supreme Court stated that unions “should [not] be neutralized when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees represented by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these cases would surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes.”

This principle was reaffirmed in *Marshall v. Ormet Corp.* In that case, the plaintiff employee alleged racial harassment at the hands of a coworker. Both the plaintiff and the alleged harasser were represented by the same union. The plaintiff alleged that the union violated its duty of fair representation when it represented the alleged harasser at the grievance and arbitration stage because it had a conflict of interest in doing so. The court granted summary judgment to the union, stating that “[u]nder Humphrey v. Moore . . . a union must and can, without violating anyone’s rights, represent employees with conflicting interests. Moreover, when faced with a conflict between its members, a union need not act neutrally.”

In situations where the union owes an affirmative and concurrent duty to two employees with competing interest, the union should be careful not to choose to pursue one employee’s cause over another’s based on invidious or irrelevant considerations, especially when the employee has a mental illness that constitutes a disability under the ADA. Nor should it let personal animosity or intra-union political issues affect its decision as to how to handle the situation. Similarly, union conduct based on general predispositions or prejudices toward employees may constitute arbitrary conduct in violation of the duty of fair representation.

28 Id. at 1471.
If competing grievances are in order, the union may seek to have them heard by different arbitrators or assign separate business agents to the cases, though no such practice is required by the duty of fair representation. The union may also reasonably conclude that only one, or neither, of the employees’ grievances is worth pursuing due to the merits of the complaints, limited union resources, or any other such reason that is not discriminatory, in bad faith, or “so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ as to be irrational.”

III. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE & BULLYING AS UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

While many of the rights and responsibilities of employees and employers in the unionized workplace are governed by the collective bargaining agreement, others are governed by statute and exist independent of the contract. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), is particularly relevant to this discussion because it proscribes violent and abusive conduct motivated by an employee’s union involvement.

Congress’s intent in passing the NLRA was to protect “the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” To that end, Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations, and also the right to refrain from doing so:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.

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29 See Labor Union Law & Regulation 325-27.
31 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
Section 8(a) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” their Section 7 rights; “to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization”; or to engage in discrimination intended to “encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 34 Similarly, unions may not restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, including the right to refrain from joining or supporting a union. 35 Unfair labor practices are brought before and remedied by the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) and may be pursued by an employee, a union, or an employer. 36

Accordingly, when an employer or its agent engages in violence, threats of violence, or other abusive behavior with the purpose or effect of improperly dissuading employees from joining or supporting a union, it has committed an unfair labor practice. 37

In Northwest Graphics, Inc., 38 the Board found that the employer committed an unfair labor practice when a supervisor berated an employee for wearing a union button. The supervisor in that case physically hit the employee’s button while shouting “with mistakes like this, how dare you shove this shit down my throat?” 39 The supervisor then referred to the button (and what it represented) as the “mistake” and said “[h]ow dare you ask for more money?” 40 The Board concluded that the supervisor’s verbal and physical outburst “reasonably conveyed a threat of lower wages or unspecified reprisals in retaliation for employees’ support for the Union.” 41

Similarly, in Garvey Marine, Inc., 42 employer threats of violence during a union organizing campaign were found to constitute an unfair labor practice. In that case, a supervisor threatened to beat up union supporters and told pro-union
employees “how easy it would be to arrange a fatal accident for a deckhand.” The supervisor also “announced that he kept a pistol for anyone who tried to keep him from working during a strike, an eventuality that he claimed would inevitably follow the deckhands’ choice of a union.” The Board held that “such powerful and dramatic threats of harm to employees, in the same way as threats to close or to discharge employees because of their union support, create precisely the legacy of coercion that endures in the workplace . . .”

Thus, when an employer uses violence or threats of violence toward employees based on their support for union activities, the employees and their union have recourse in the form of an unfair labor practice charge under the NLRA.

IV. EMPLOYER POLICIES GOVERNING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE & BULLYING AND THE NLRA

The relatively recent focus on workplace violence and bullying as an employment relations problem has prompted many employers to issue written policies, or amend existing ones, aimed at curbing such behavior in the workplace. In the unionized workplace, this implicates the parties’ legal rights and responsibilities in significant ways. As discussed below, employer implementation of such work rules and policies must be squared with (a) the employer’s obligation to bargain with the union over changes to employees’ terms and conditions of employment, and (b) the employees’ statutory right to engage in protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA.

A. Employer’s Obligation to Bargain With the Union

Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that “[j]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . . .” Section 8(d) of the Act defines collective bargaining as “the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Under this statutory scheme, an employer violates the NLRA when it unilaterally

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43 Id. at 994.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 994-95.
46 David C. Yamada, Crafting a Legislative Response to Workplace Bullying, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL 475, 477-78 (2004) (noting that the concept of workplace bullying did not even “enter the vocabulary of American employment relations until the late 1990s”).
makes material changes to employees’ terms and conditions of employment on subjects of mandatory bargaining—i.e., wages, hours, and other terms and conditions—without first affording notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain.\(^{49}\)

To be sure, workplace violence and bullying policies that could be grounds for employee discipline or discharge are mandatory subjects of bargaining.\(^{50}\) Accordingly, work rules and policies prohibiting certain conduct under penalty of discipline or discharge cannot be implemented or materially changed by the employer without first providing the union with timely notice and an opportunity to bargain.

While the NLRA does not “compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession,”\(^{51}\) it does require that the parties bargain in good faith. Good faith bargaining is that which is done with a “bona fide intent to reach an agreement.”\(^{52}\) Thus, an employer does not satisfy its bargaining obligations with respect to the implementation of a workplace violence or bullying policy simply by going through the motions. Rather, the employer’s actions must reflect a genuine desire to achieve a mutually agreeable resolution.

The union’s right to engage in bargaining over the implementation of policies with disciplinary elements also encompasses the right to information relevant to the proposed change.\(^{53}\) To establish relevance, the union need “only demonstrate that the requested information is probably relevant and that it will be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities.”\(^{54}\) The Board has adopted a “liberal discovery type standard” which allows unions to access a broad range of potential useful information for the purposes of effectuating the bargaining process.\(^{55}\) Indeed, “not much is required to justify a union’s request for information


\(^{50}\) See, e.g., Southern Mail, Inc., 345 NLRB 644, 646 (2005) ("Mandatory subjects of bargaining include the circumstances in which discipline will be imposed for violations of employer policies."); Flambeau Arnold Corp., 334 NLRB 165, 166 (2001) (duty to bargain existed regarding changes to sick leave policy providing for employee discipline); Bath Iron Works Corp., 302 NLRB 898, 902 (1991) (duty to bargain existed regarding changes to alcohol and drug policies which “created entirely new grounds for discipline”).


\(^{52}\) Atlas Mills, 3 NLRB 10, 21 (1937).

\(^{53}\) See Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 244 NLRB 119, 121 (1979) (discussing duty to provide information generally), enfd. 617 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1980).

\(^{54}\) Kathleen’s Bakeshop, LLC, 337 NLRB 1081, 1093 (2002).

that is related to its bargaining unit representation functions."\textsuperscript{56} As such, to satisfy its bargaining obligation vis-à-vis a proposed workplace violence or bullying policy, an employer must comply with any request from the union for information relevant to the proposed policy and its impact on employees within the bargaining unit.

An employer may be excused from its obligation to bargain over the implementation of a work rule or policy, but only if the union has clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the same. It is well settled that “national labor policy disfavors waivers of statutorily protected rights,"\textsuperscript{57} and thus only “clear and unmistakable” waivers of such rights are recognized by the Board.\textsuperscript{58} Notably, the “clear and unmistakable” waiver standard adopted and consistently applied by the Board has also been approved by the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{59} The employer bears the burden of proving a defense based on the union’s waiver of its statutory right to bargain over the implementation of a work rule or policy.\textsuperscript{60}

B. Employees’ Right to Engage in Protected Concerted Activity

As noted above, Section 7 of the NLRA provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”\textsuperscript{61} Under the NLRA, employers may not implement work rules or policies which tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.\textsuperscript{62} Before discussing how employer policies touching on workplace violence or bullying implicate employees’ Section 7 rights, it is necessary to briefly review the underlying concept of “protected concerted activity.”

\textsuperscript{56} Crowley Marine Servs. v. NLRB, 234 F.3d 1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
\textsuperscript{57} Olivetti Office USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 926 F.2d 181, 187 (2d. Cir. 1991); see Local Union 36, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 706 F.3d 73, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2013).
\textsuperscript{59} See NLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967) (upholding Board’s application of the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard in finding that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement did not constitute a waiver of the union’s bargaining rights); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) (“We will not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is ‘explicitly stated.’ More succinctly, the waiver must be clear and unmistakable.”).
\textsuperscript{60} See Olivetti, 926 F.2d at 187; NLRB v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 930 F.2d 1009, 1011 (“The employer bears the weighty burden of establishing that a ‘clear and unmistakable’ waiver has occurred.”).
\textsuperscript{62} See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
1. **Concerted Activity**

Only conduct that is “concerted” comes within the ambit of Section 7. Conduct is “concerted” under Section 7 if it is undertaken by two or more employees, or by one employee on behalf of others.\(^{63}\) Concerted activity includes individual employees seeking to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action, as well as individual employees bringing group complaints to the attention of management.\(^{64}\) Concerted activity generally does not include an activity by a single employee for that individual’s own personal benefit; however, individual activity involving attempts to enforce provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is concerted.\(^{65}\)

2. **Protected Activity**

In order to avail themselves of Section 7’s protections, employees who engage in concerted conduct must do so for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.”\(^{66}\) Employees engage in such protected activity when their efforts are aimed at improving the terms and conditions of employment.\(^{67}\) This includes when employees act to “improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.”\(^{68}\)

Conduct that is satirical or even scornful toward the employer or coworkers but that is still aimed at improving working conditions is for mutual aid or protection under the NLRA.\(^{69}\) However, actions that are intended merely to belittle or harass the company or other coworkers and not to protest working conditions are not protected.\(^{70}\) Indeed, “some concerted activity bears a less immediate relationship to employees’ interests as employees than other such activity,” and “at some point the relationship becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly” be viewed as for the purpose of mutual aid and protection.\(^{71}\)

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\(^{63}\) See Meyers Indus., 268 NLRB 493, 497 (1983).

\(^{64}\) See id.; see also Alton H. Piester, 353 NLRB 369 (2008) (finding that an individual who repeats a complaint previously expressed by a larger group of employees engages in concerted activity because this is a continuation of concerted activity).

\(^{65}\) See Interboro Contractors, 157 NLRB 1295 (1966); see also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (“An individual’s invocation of a right rooted in the collective bargaining agreement is an integral part of the collective bargaining process and is therefore a ‘concerted’ activity even though the individual employee may not have cited the CBA or stated that he was acting on behalf of others.”).


\(^{68}\) Id.

\(^{69}\) See Reef Indus. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1991).

\(^{70}\) See New River Indus. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1991).

\(^{71}\) Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567-68.
3. **Implications for Workplace Violence or Bullying Policies**

Not only are employers prohibited from directly disciplining or discharging employees for engaging in protected concerted activity under Section 7, they are also prohibited from implementing work rules or policies that have the effect of restraining employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. Thus, in implementing work rules or policies, employers may not prohibit a broad swath of conduct that also encompasses statutorily protected acts.

As a general rule, in determining whether the maintenance of work rules or policies violates the Act, “the appropriate inquiry is whether the rules would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”

If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Section 7, the violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.

In *Claremont Resort & Spa*, the Board found that the employer violated the NLRA by issuing and maintaining a policy stating that “Negative conversations about associates [i.e., coworkers] and/or managers are in violation of our Standards of Conduct that may result in disciplinary action.” The Board held that “the rule’s prohibition of ‘negative conversations’ about managers would reasonably be construed by employees to bar them from discussing with their coworkers complaints about their managers that affected working conditions, thereby causing employees to refrain from engaging in protected activities.” As such, the policy was deemed unlawful.

Similarly, in *Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.*, the Board found unlawful the discharge of several employees under a “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting “bullying and harassment.” The employees in that case had posted comments on Facebook critical of their supervisor, which the Board held to be protected concerted activity under the NLRA. The Board also found that the employer could not lawfully apply its anti-bullying policy because “legitimate managerial concerns to prevent harassment do not justify policies that discourage the free exercise of Section 7

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74 344 NLRB 832, 832 (2005) (alteration added).
75 Id.
76 359 NLRB No. 37, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 14, 2012).
77 Id.
rights by subjecting employees to . . . discipline on the basis of the subjective reactions of others to their protected activity.”  

In contrast, the Acting General Counsel recently concluded that an employer’s policy regarding online bullying was lawful under the NLRA. The relevant policy stated, in pertinent part, that “any harassment, bullying, discrimination, or retaliation that would not be permissible in the workplace is not permissible between co-workers online, even if it is done after hours, from home and on home computers.” Without much explanation, and arguably contrary to Board precedent, the Acting General Counsel found that employees would not reasonably construe that language to prohibit protected concerted activity because “the rule contains a list of plainly egregious conduct, such as bullying and discrimination.” As such, the Acting General Counsel deemed that anti-bullying provision consistent with the NLRA.

Finally, it should be noted that the inclusion of a disclaimer or “savings clause” in a work rule or policy will not necessarily cure an unlawfully overbroad provision contained therein. An example of such a clause might be: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing herein shall be construed as limiting any employee’s rights under of National Labor Relations Act.” To the extent such a clause would require employees to be labor lawyers in order to understand the full panoply of their rights under the NLRA, and thus what activities truly are permitted despite the overbroad language, it would not render an otherwise overbroad policy lawful. On the other hand, if a savings clause adequately clarifies overbroad provisions such that a reasonable employee would understand that he or she is not prohibited from engaging in any activities protected by Section 7, it may well have some curative effect.

In sum, while employers’ efforts to address the problem of workplace violence and bullying are commendable, in the unionized workplace, they generally must bargain with the union over the implementation of such work rules or policies. Further, overbroad policies that have the purpose or effect of chilling employees’ Section 7 rights will not pass muster under the NLRA, and thus may subject the employer to an unfair labor practice charge.

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78 Id. at 3 (quoting Consol. Diesel Co., 332 NLRB 1019, 1020 (2000), enf'd. 263 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2001)).
80 Id. at 13.
81 Id. at 13-14.
82 See NLRB Memo. OM 12-59 at 12, 14.
CONCLUSION

In seeking to address the problem of workplace violence and bullying, unions should look to the collective bargaining agreement to see if there is a grievance to pursue on behalf of the alleged victim, aggressor, or both. They also should look to the NLRA when employer violence or threats of violence tend to restrain employees in the exercise of their right to engage in union activities. Finally, unions should also be prepared to demand bargaining when employers seek to implement work rules or policies purporting to govern workplace violence and bullying, and ensure that such policies do not infringe on employees’ statutory right to engage in protected activity.