The ability to recognize the ethical or moral implications of situations is known as moral (ethical) sensitivity. This paper describes the development of the concept of ethical sensitivity in the field of cognitive moral psychology and current research that examines ethical sensitivity. This significance of ethical sensitivity for the field of organizational communication is discussed. Because business ethics scholars have been the primary investigators of ethics in organizations, weaknesses of empirical and theoretical research about moral decision-making in the field of business ethics are described. Methods for studying ethical sensitivity in organizations are discussed, with a focus on cognitive mapping as an improvement over many of the current methods used in business ethics research. Finally, questions from the field of organizational communication that might be answered using the construct of ethical sensitivity are discussed.

Rudolf Hoess, the man in charge of Auschwitz, believed that he was an upstanding German citizen who was effectively doing the job he was assigned and providing for his family in an honorable fashion. He believed that by following the orders of his superiors, and doing his job, he was "contributing to his own honor and the honor of a larger system....He...was making a contribution to a system of values that contained a major ideal: obey authority" (Katz, 1993, p. 67). In Hoess's mind he was an ethical person.

While we would like to think that Hoess was a monster...
Unlike any of us, the man described is relatively ordinary whose evil actions were performed in the context of his professional life. Often, managers and other professionals justify their decisions by saying, "I'm just doing my job. If we don't get that contract (sale, lower price, etc.) my career won't advance and my organization will be hurt" (c.f., Gellerman, 1986). Henderson (1992, p. 18) discusses a study of one thousand companies that Fortune magazine carried out in 1980. From that study, Fortune concluded "most unethical behavior [is] situational rather than criminally intentional. These were bad situations not bad people. One executive argued, 'I've always thought of myself as an honorable citizen. We didn't do these things for our own behalf...[but] for the betterment of the company'" (Ross, 1980, p. 62).

Common sense suggests that people will easily be able to recognize highly evil actions and also will be able to recognize more subtle ethical issues. However, recognizing that a decision-making situation has ethical components may not be as easy as is suggested by common sense. The ability to recognize the ethical or moral implications of situations is known as moral or ethical sensitivity, a concept which developed in the field of moral psychology. As communication scholars, we might wonder what role communication plays in influencing ethical sensitivity or how sensitive people are to communication-related ethical issues in organizations. This paper examines these issues.

In the first section, I discuss the lineage of cognitive moral development theory as developed by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Rest. I then discuss current research on ethical sensitivity. In section two of the paper, I discuss the relationship of communication to ethics and ethical sensitivity. The third section of the paper discusses the current state of the business ethics literature as it relates to decision-making and ethical sensitivity because business ethics scholars have been the primary investigators of ethics in organizations. Next, I consider methods for studying ethics and ethical sensitivity in organizations, with a focus on cognitive mapping. I conclude with questions in the field of organizational communication that might be answered using the construct of ethical sensitivity.

What is ethical sensitivity?

Ethical sensitivity is a construct that developed in the field of moral psychology. According to Rest (1983), the study of cognitive moral development, of which ethical sensitivity is a part, has its roots in Piaget's[1] studies of children's cognitive development. Piaget suggested that children proceed through two stages of moral development: the morality of constraint and the morality of cooperation. (Rest, 1983, pp. 571-573; Lickona, 1976. pp. 219-221). The morality of constraint is when the child is told what the rules are and is then expected to follow the rules. If the rules are not followed, the child can expect punishment. Morality at this stage is an external, objective phenomenon over which the child has no control. According to Piaget, the more advanced stage is the morality of cooperation. At this stage children learn that morality is affected by their actions; they can create the rules of morality through interchanges with their peers. As Rest (1983, p. 571) states, "the child gradually discovers the possibilities and conditions of cooperation that are not motivated by unilateral respect, but by the mutual respect of collaborators for each other and by their solidarity in
For many years, Piaget's cognitive focus on moral development was ignored in favor of other theories, such as psychoanalytic (also called identification-internalization) and social-learning (from the behaviorist school) theories of moral development (Aronfreed, 1976; Walker, 1986). Both of these approaches suggest that morality is learned by children either by watching behavior modeled by adults or by positive and negative reinforcement received from caregivers. In the late 1950s, Kohlberg challenged the predominant behaviorist view in psychology by seeking to study moral cognition (Rest, 1994). Kohlberg based his study of moral cognitions on Piaget’s stage model. He developed a stage model which consists of three levels with two stages in each level. The three levels are preconventional (Stages 1 and 2), conventional (Stages 3 and 4), and principled (Stages 5 and 6). At Stage 1 being moral consists of following the rules; people follow the rules to avoid punishment and because of “the superior power of authorities” (Kohlberg, 1976 p. 34). At Stage 2 being moral means that equal exchanges are made, people follow the rules only when it is in their best interest. Right actions are taken “to serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have recognized that other people have their interests, too” (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 34). At Stage 3 the individual wants to live up to the expectations of important people in his or her life. Individuals want to be good sons, daughters, friends, spouses. At this stage, the person makes choices so that he or she can “be a good person in [his or her] own eyes.” He or she maintains “a belief in the Golden Rule' and wants to "maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 34). At Stage 4 the individual values the contribution that laws and doing one's duty make to maintaining social order. People perform right actions so that the social system remains unthreatened. This stage differs from Stage 3 in that Stage 3 focuses on maintaining close interpersonal relationships while Stage 4 focuses on one's duty to obey laws in order to uphold the structure of society. In Stage 5, people recognize that moral values are relative to one’s social group; others may hold different values and opinions. At this level, people believe that rationally developed laws and duties that consider overall good are best. Kohlberg notes that “these relative rules should usually be, upheld...in the interest of impartiality and because they are a social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like life and liberty must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion” (p. 36). Stage 6 people hold universal moral principles. At this stage, "morality is defined by how rational and impartial people would ideally organize cooperation" (Rest, 1994, p. 5).

Kohlberg believed that people progress, in order, through the stages; once a stage has been achieved, there is no regression to a previous stage. Rest (1983, p. 586) clarifies this progression when he notes, "the acquisition of cognitive structures is gradual rather than abrupt: acquisition is not an all-or-nothing matter but rather is better depicted as a gradual increase in the probability of occurrence....subjects are not simply 'in' one stage or another but fluctuate within a developmental range." Evidence summarized by Walker (1986) suggests that overall the stage model is an accurate portrayal of people's moral reasoning development.

Although many scholars believe that this model is an
excellent representation of cognitive moral judgment development, others have suggested that this model has serious problems. People have charged that the model is culturally biased, biased towards cognitive development that individuals may not desire, and biased against women. In answer to these charges, Rest (1994) summarizes research that suggests that the model stands up across cultures (using this model, work was done in Hong Kong, Korea, Iceland, and Australia) with similar results in all the cultures studied. He also points out that individuals prefer the highest cognitive stage they can comprehend (Rest, 1994, pp. 16-17) and that women (when categorized using DIT scores, Rest's method of analyzing people's progression through the stages) tend to score slightly higher than men. (Rest, 1986, p. 113: see also Weber, 1990, p. 689 for further discussion of support for Kohlberg's work.)

After years of working with Kohlberg's stage theory of cognitive moral judgment development, Rest developed his Four-Component Model when doing a review of the literature of moral psychology. He thought that there was a need to integrate various aspects of the morality literature which seemed to be talking about different parts of the same construct. (Rest, 1994, p. 22) Stage theory, Rest believes, is incomplete because it only addressed the process of making an ethical judgment. Stage theory does not consider how people perceive ethical dilemmas, how they choose among various possible actions, or what goes into actually carrying out a moral action. The Four-Component model suggests that:

the production of moral behavior in a particular situation involves (1) interpreting the situation in terms of how people's welfare is affected by possible actions of the subject [moral sensitivity], (2) figuring out what the ideally moral course of action would be [moral judgment], (3) selecting among valued outcomes to intend to the moral course of action [moral motivation], and (4) executing and implementing what one intends to do [moral character]. (Rest, 1983, p. 559)

This model is not a stage step model, like Kohlberg's theory, where Component I must precede Component II and so on. Rest and his colleagues believe that the components can influence one another; for example, your interpretation of the situation (Component I) may be affected by your overall value structure, including nonmoral values (Component III). He (1983, p. 570) says that "although the four components suggest a logical sequence, each component influences the other components through feedback and feedforward loops."

As Rest notes, there is, overall, a good deal of evidence to support his Four-Component Model, which he cites in his 1986 book. Greatest support exists for Component II, which deals with moral judgment development. Rest (1983, p. 570) states that there are thousands of citations that support developmental stages in Component II. While non-moral development research exists for perception and the schemata involved in perception (the foundation of Component I), there is not as much research on how people specifically perceive ethical issues. Components III and IV are not central to this paper and research supporting them will not be discussed, except to direct the reader to Rest's earlier works and note that, according to Rest, the least research has been performed on Component III, choosing between
The largest strand of research in moral sensitivity has been done by Bebeau and her colleagues; they have studied the ethical sensitivity of dental students since 1980 (Bebeau, 1994; Bebeau, Rest, & Yamoor, 1985). Note that they use the term 'ethical' sensitivity instead of 'moral' sensitivity. They do so because they are "measuring the individual's ability to interpret factors in the care setting that relate directly to obligations stated in the profession's code of ethics" (Bebeau, 1994, p. 123). This paper will use the term 'ethical' instead of 'moral' sensitivity because of the common use of the term 'ethical' instead of 'moral' in the field of business ethics. Other works (Duckett & Ryden, 1994; Bredemeier & Shields, 1994; Volker, 1984, as cited in Rest, 1986) have examined moral sensitivity in nursing, sports, and counseling. Another approach to ethical sensitivity has been taken by Lind and Rarick (1994, 1995). Instead of examining how sensitive professionals are to ethical issues within their field, as the previously cited studies did, they are interested in examining how people outside the profession perceive ethical issues in the news provided to them by the news media. In their work, they examine how sensitive news viewers are to ethical issues in the creation of news stories. They suggest that ethical sensitivity consists of the:

1. Ability to comprehend and understand special characteristics of the situation....including the actors involved, the actions taken, and the setting or context.

2. Ability to see possible ethical issues or problems in the situation, as evidenced by the events portrayed in the news story, and understanding that participants in the story have rights and responsibilities.

3. Ability to see possible consequences or outcomes of the ethical choices made.... in terms of how specific reporting actions reflected in the news story would affect specific types of persons.

4. Ability to see what types of persons would be affected by those outcomes or consequences (called stakeholders), and to indicate how those persons would be affected, given their respective rights and responsibilities.

5. Ability to understand and interpret how the four factors of situation, ethical issue, consequences, and stakeholders interact or are linked to compose a larger system in which the person discusses his or her reasoning and evaluations about the presence or absence of ethical issues. (Rarick, Lind, and Swenson-Lepper, 1995, pp. 6-7)

This perspective suggests that there are five aspects of ethical sensitivity: perception of the special characteristics of the situation, the issues present, stakeholders to the action, consequences for those stakeholders, and the connections between the categories. This definition of ethical sensitivity will be used throughout this paper. This definition squares with Rest's (1986, p. 3) more detailed definition of Component I where he says that "the person must have been able to make some sort of interpretation of the particular situation in terms..."
of what actions were possible, who (including oneself) would be affected by each course of action, and how the interested parties would regard such effects on their welfare."

How are ethics and ethical sensitivity related to communication in organizations?

Generally, when we think about ethics, we think about 'wrong' (or evil) action (Toffler, 1986, p. 10). What 'evil' or 'wrong' decisions have businesses in the modern era made? Sad to say, but the voluminous writings about business ethics (over 2,300 citations from 1982 to the present in the Business Index Database) are often inspired by unethical behavior by businesses. Frequently cited examples of unethical behavior by large organizations are the Beech Nut apple juice decision (Aguilar, 1994, p. 4-5), E. F. Hutton's check kiting scheme (Henderson, 1992, p. 165), the savings and loan scandal, Tailhook, etc. Although we generally see and hear about unethical decisions of corporations, there are also examples of companies that have made choices thought to be of high ethical quality. The most frequently noted example is of Johnson and Johnson's decision to pull Tylenol(TM) capsules off the market in light of the poison crisis (Hodgson, 1992, p. 31; Aguilar, 1994, p. 65). T.G.I. Fridays restaurant chain, Chemical Bank, Dayton Hudson Corporation, and other companies are presented as organizations where good ethical decisions are generally made; these companies enjoy excellent reputations based on high ethical standards (Hodgson, 1992; Henderson, 1992).

As has been noted throughout the centuries (Golden, Berquist, & Coleman, 1983. p. 4), communication (or rhetorc) and ethics are intimately tied together. From Aristotle's 'a good man speaking well' to Golden, Berquist, & Coleman's statement that "genuine rhetoric occurs when a communicator presents an informative or suasive ethical verbal (written or oral) or non-verbal message specifically designed to create a persuasive effect in an audience comprised of readers or listeners who have a choice or perceived choice and the power to modify the exigencies upon which the discourse is constructed" (emphasis added, p. 5). While it is easy to understand how ethics plays a role in informative or persuasive public discourse, it may be less clear when the topic is organizational communication and everyday ethical judgments and decisions.

Different forms of communication in organizations either implicitly or explicitly establish ethical standards in organizations. Organizational codes for ethical conduct (Stevens, 1994), orientation programs (Pribble, 1990), newsletters, speeches, and directions from supervisors are all explicit ways of communicating ethical standards in organizations. Standards may be implicitly communicated when codes and actual practice contradict each other. Jansen and von Glinow (1985) discuss the idea that organizational reward systems often reinforce behavior counter to those very organization's ethical codes. For example, bonuses tied to sales results may communicate that results are most important and may encourage people to inflate sales reports or cheat to get results. Colleagues or standard practices provide information about what are appropriate, but not necessarily ethical, actions within the organization.

Besides the process that institutes ethical standards in organizations, communication is also seen as a method for
enhancing ethical decision-making. Sims (1994) suggests that in order to make more ethical decisions, more conflict needs to be stimulated and that people need to brainstorm and use other decision techniques (pp. 112 ff.). Aguilar (1994), Toffler (1986), and Waters and Bird (1987) suggest that in order for people to consider the ethical dimensions of decisions, ethics needs to become a legitimate topic of conversations in business places. Unfortunately, as Aguilar (1994) and Toffler (1986) note, discussions of ethical dilemmas by employees with managers or peers are frequently discouraged in contemporary organizations. Toffler (1986, p. 339) states "What I have been urging is better communication*. Managers at all levels of the organization and their employees must learn to *express* their ethical concerns and *to listen to and hear* each other as they do so. Without such effective exchange, the ethically best intentions are likely to fall short of effective implementation." (emphasis in text)

More specifically, researchers studying cognitive moral development have found that communication with others is an effective way of developing moral judgment. While it is easy to assume that Kohlberg believed that moral development occurred at the exclusion of outside influence because of his cognitive focus, he assumed that social interaction (communication) influenced cognitive moral development. He (1976, p. 48) assumed that: "basic moral norms and principles are structures arising through experiences of social interaction, rather than through internalization of rules that exist as external structures; moral stages are not defined by internalized rules, but by structures of interaction between the self and others" and that "environmental influences in moral development are defined by the general quality and extent of cognitive and social stimulation throughout the child's development, rather than by specific experiences with parents or experiences of discipline, punishment, and reward."

In several studies, individuals' moral development levels have been raised through interventions. Rest (1986, p. 81) found, in a meta-analysis of moral development studies that examined the change in moral judgment development scores, that "dilemma discussion programs have on the average the greatest impact, followed by personality development programs" (modest effect sizes of .41 and .36, respectively). Both types of programs tend to focus on communication. In dilemma discussion groups, people discuss different view points on moral dilemmas. Rest (1986, pp. 79-80) suggests that these groups are effective because they provide "concentrated practice in moral problem-solving stimulated by peer give-and-take (challenging one another's thinking, reexamining assumptions. being exposed to different points of view, building lines of argument, and responding to counter argument)." The second kind of intervention focuses on personal psychological development. These programs include interaction with others, but focus on self-analysis. Rest (1986, p. 80) comments "the programs involve subjects in diverse kinds of activities (e.g., cross-age teaching, empathy training, communication skills training, cooperation simulation games, volunteer service work, keeping logs about one's personal thoughts and feelings), but the activities all have the objective of promoting reflection about the self and self in relation to others." Although interventions can help people advance in their moral judgment development level, Rest points out that people are not likely to advance through several stages because of an intervention. He says (1986, p. 60) "the
In addition to affecting individuals' moral judgment development stage, it also seems likely that communication can have a direct influence on ethical sensitivity by helping people create new schemata about specific behaviors and courses of action. For example, prior to consciousness raising efforts, sexual harassment was not an issue for many people. People did not perceive their comments or behaviors as 'sexual harassment.' The common attitude was that the behaviors were 'all in fun' and that the person the behaviors were directed at should ignore the behaviors. Organizations with sexual harassment policies have influenced the schemata of their members to perceive certain types of behavior as fitting into the category of sexual harassment. Organizations like the United States Navy even provide specific lists of behaviors that are unacceptable (definitely fit the category or schema of sexual harassment), questionable (behaviors may or may not be interpreted as sexual harassment, so the behaviors should be avoided) or acceptable (behaviors that are definitely acceptable). Now that people have a schema for sexual harassment, they are likely to be more sensitive to moral dilemmas and decisions where that behavior is evidenced. It seems likely that schemata that influence ethical sensitivity could be moderated by peer communication, behavior modeled by others, formal communication, gossip, stories, rituals, etc.

Why is ethical sensitivity an important construct for studying ethics in organizations?

Ethical sensitivity is an important construct for studying ethics in organizations for two reasons. First, the term is already used in the business ethics literature, but not in the same sense of Rest's model. Second, this construct offers a different theoretical approach than the one commonly taken in business ethics. In the section that follows, I will be discussing 'business' ethics instead of 'organizational' ethics because the study of ethics in organizations has occurred primarily in business schools and researchers from business schools have, for the most part, studied people in corporations; they generally refer to their area of study as 'business ethics'.

Some business ethics scholars recognize the importance of ethical sensitivity, but they do not define or use it in a consistent manner. Moral sensitivity to Rossouw (1994 p. 17), a post-modernist, is an outcome that occurs through participation in moral discussion: people will "become aware and sensitive of implications of their moral stance which they either have not foreseen or haven't realized the full extent of, in the past." In his work moral sensitivity is the precursor to advancing one's moral development (p. 19) because one's eyes are opened to the implications of one's beliefs through confronting the opposing beliefs of another. For Rossouw, ethical sensitivity is a process of becoming more aware of the consequences of beliefs.

While not a central feature of his paper, Schlacter (1990) uses the term ethical sensitivity to refer to how well professionals can detect the ethical aspects of work.
situations, a definition similar to Rest's. Schlacter believes that this sensitivity is influenced by the "kinds of tasks performed, and the values communicated by office colleagues" (p. 841). Likewise, Payne and Giacalone (1990, p. 652) discuss ethical sensitivity in terms of a person's ability to detect an ethical issue. Like Schlacter, they believe that ethical sensitivity is affected by forces in the individual's environment. These last two views of ethical sensitivity are similar to Rest's, but ethical sensitivity has not, to my knowledge, been studied in business ethics, nor have the forces that influence ethical sensitivity been studied.

Using the construct of ethical sensitivity provides a different theoretical approach for understanding how people come to make ethical decisions. Instead of examining the moral frameworks that people use to make decisions, ethical sensitivity focuses our attention on whether people are able to perceive the ethical aspects of a decision-making dilemma. By examining ethical sensitivity, we are looking at a component that precedes an individual's ability to make a judgment or a decision. If you do not perceive that a decision situation has ethical aspects, you will not be able to make ethical judgments or carry out behaviors in accordance with those judgments.

How can Rest's Four-Component Model provide structure for business ethics research?

In this section of the paper, I will discuss the current state of business ethics research, with a focus on ethical decision-making and judgment. Ford & Richardson (1994) did a recent review of the empirical literature on ethical decision-making in which they reviewed 50 studies, including information about the sample, methods, and basic findings of each study. Their review of the literature includes articles published through 1992; because of the comprehensive nature of their review, no such review will be undertaken here; articles discussed here were, with few exceptions (Delaney & Sockell, 1992; Lacznik & Inderrieden, 1987; Weber, 1990), not reviewed by Ford and Richardson. Ford and Richardson divide the studies into two categories: individual and situational factors influencing decisions. In Table 1 (available by request from the author), the studies reviewed in this paper are categorized by whether they are concerned primarily with individual or situational factors.

Ford and Richardson (1994) broke individual factors into personal attributes (consisting of religion, nationality, sex, and age); education and employment background (consisting of type of education, years of education, employment and years of employment); and personality/beliefs/values (consisting of Machiavellianism, neuroticism, extroversion, value orientation; locus of control; role conflict and ambiguity; and acceptance of authority). Ford and Richardson (1994) found that interpersonal attributes like age, sex, religion] are related to an individual's ethical beliefs and decision making in some studies but not in others" (p. 210). They found that in some cases, but not in others, "type and years of education and type and years of employment are related to an individual's ethical beliefs and decision making behavior" (p. 211). They found that in some studies, but not in all, "personality traits of the decision maker are related to his/her ethical beliefs and behavior" (p. 210). The only personality trait that was strongly associated with
ethical beliefs was Machiavellianism. (p. 210). Overall, individual factors are not a good predictor of ethical beliefs.

Situational factors that Ford and Richardson (1994) found in the literature were referent groups (including peer group influence, top management influence, and rewards and sanctions); codes of conduct; type of ethical conflict; organizational factors (including organization effects, organization size, and organization level); and industry factors (including industry type and business competitiveness). For situational factors, Ford and Richardson (1994) found that studies generally support the idea that "the direct influence of the person's peers increases as the intensity and frequency of contact with that person's peers increases. People see themselves as more ethical than their peers, co-workers, and supervisors in their ethical beliefs and decision making behavior" (p. 212). In relation to top management and rewards, Ford and Richardson review studies that support the idea that "an individual's ethical beliefs and decision making behavior will increasingly become congruent with top management's beliefs as defined through their words and actions as rewards provided for compliance congruency are increased" (p. 216). They report that current studies generally support the idea that corporate codes of ethics change decision-making for the better; they suggest that organizational members might change their behavior because of rewards and sanctions from top management for code compliance, not because of the mere presence of a code. (p. 216). Stevens (1994), on the other hand, reviewed the literature about codes and suggests that there is only a very weak link between a corporation's conduct and having an ethical code. They also found mixed results for the idea that the type of ethical dilemma affects the type of ethical decision. (p. 216). For organizational factors, the studies they report support the idea that "the more ethical the climate and culture of an organization is, the more ethical an individual's ethical beliefs and decision behavior will be. The strength of this influence may be moderated by the structure and design of some organizations" (p. 217).

Another way of organizing the mass of confusing and sometimes contradictory literature in the field of business ethics is by using Rest's Four Component Model as an organizational system. While many other models exist that seek to put together all of the influences on individual's ethical decision-making processes (Knouse and Giacalone, 1992; Bommer et al, 1987; Trevino, 1986), Rest's work done in the field of moral psychology seems to provide a better model to guide the direction of research; his model gives research findings a place in an overall picture of an individual's ethical decision-making and judgment in organizations. His model, which is based on empirical data from the moral psychology field, allows for the complex interplay of factors that contribute to an individual's ethical choice.

Component I

Component I of the Four-Component Model is concerned with the individual's ability to detect that a situation has ethical components. Only two articles were concerned primarily with this component. At the theoretical level, Payne and Giacalone (1990) suggest that a model that examines people's ethics should include moral psychology.
theory research like Kohlberg's and theory and research into perceptual concepts and moral judgment. Perceptual concepts include attributions, cognitive distortions, and impression management. They suggest that 'perceptual processes of attributions and cognitive distortions...can describe how individuals attribute blame or responsibility to themselves and others for particular actor's....impression management...helps to explain how individuals try to influence the perceptions that others have of them so as to gain favorable attribution” (p. 653). However, while Payne and Giacalone (1990) address Rest's Four-Component Model, they do not seem to understand it. They discuss the Four-Component Model and say that it is "a four-component process leading to moral conduct that includes situational interpretation moral reasoning or judgment, alternative conduct deliberations, and implementation of the moral plan of action" (p. 651). Then, one page later, they raise questions that Rest (1986) addresses in his book, _Moral Development: Advances in Research and Theory_. They ask:

We might inquire about individual perception of or sensitivity to the very existence of an ethical dilemma. Why do some individuals appear to be less aware of ethical or moral dilemmas in everyday life and fail to take subsequent steps with regard to these situations? . . . Essentially, we will argue that processes exist apart from the moral reasoning process itself; such processes augment the perception of ethical dilemmas, as they might augment the perception of other situational determinants of behavior. Thus, while the particular stages of moral development proposed by Kohlberg or Piaget, for example, have influenced our understanding of different levels of moral reasoning, they have not addressed certain biases and sensitivities in perceptual and communication processes [sic] that influence moral decisions and conduct. (p. 652)

Having just discussed Rest's Four-Component Model, the authors proceed to reinvent Component One (Moral Sensitivity). Rest said that Component I was not exclusively a moral process. He (1986) says of Component 1:

We must not under estimate the difficulty in interpreting social situations nor must we assume that all misinterpretation is defensive in nature, even though people sometimes may not 'see' things because they are defensively blocking them from conscious recognition. We are just beginning to understand how complicated it is to interpret social situations. The vast new emerging field of social cognition. . .is clarifying the complications in cue detection, information integration, and inference-making that are involved in developing the ability to interpret social situations. (p. 6; see also Rest, 1983, p. 560)

Rest also believes that each of the components is a separate process; he asks "when a person is behaving morally, what must we suppose has happened psychologically to produce that behavior? Our answer to that question. . .is to postulate that four major kinds of psychological processes must have occurred in order for moral behavior to occur” (1986, p. 3). Further, Rest does not deny that there are social influences on individuals' moral decision making. He suggests in a
brief review of his Four-Component Model that "an all-inclusive review of morality research would discuss all four components, both the affective and cognitive aspects, both developmental and nondevelopmental aspects, both individual and group processes" (1983, p. 570, emphasis added). It seems that Payne and Giacalone could have benefited from a closer reading of Rest's work.

On the empirical front, Tyson (1990) describes a study where people generally believe that they are more ethical than others. This study fits under Component I, moral sensitivity, because it examines how people interpret ethical decision-making situations in terms of what the individual would do based on what they believe others would do. Remember that ethical sensitivity includes interpreting how other "interested parties would regard such effects on their welfare" (Rest, 1986, p.3). Tyson (1990) explains people's unethical behavior and their belief that they are more ethical than others in terms of the prisoner's dilemma. In the prisoner's dilemma, people can profit the most by choosing the most unethical decision, as long as the other person does not choose the most unethical decision. People assume others will make the most unethical decision, so they must also make it, even if they do not agree with it, in order to survive. While an interesting proposition, he did not provide an analysis of whether the ten behaviors he gave subjects in a questionnaire were statistically distinct and did not provide any information about measures of power, reliability, or validity.

Component II

Component II is concerned with the process of making moral judgments. Just as Rest found in the field of moral psychology, the field of business ethics' research is dominated by studies that focus on individual factors that contribute to moral judgment. Different scholars have used different approaches to examine moral judgment in business ethics; some have examined the moral standards used by managers (Bird & Waters, 1987), the relationship of an individual's ethical ideology to how they reason about moral issues (Barnett, Bass, & Brown, 1994), or the relationship between a multidimensional-scale based on moral philosophies and ethical judgments (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990; Hansen, 1992; Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993).

Bird and Waters (1987) attempt to describe the moral standards of managers. They did not propose what these standards might be, but attempted to discover them through interviews. They found that managers held the following standards: managers should be honest in communication, managers should treat people fairly, managers should give special treatment for special situations, competition between organizations should be fair, managers should act in the organization's best interest, managers should practice corporate social responsibility, and managers should respect the laws. While they were doing exploratory research to discover what kinds of moral standards managers might have, their report of their methodology is lacking. They report that they performed interviews with managers and they generally describe the interview process, but they do not describe their interview schedule or other devices to maintain consistency across their 193 cases. They are not clear about whether the n in this study refers to sample size or a total number of moral dilemmas, which may include more than one for each manager.
Barnett, Bass, and Brown (1994) test Forsyth's model that suggests that differences in ethical ideology affect how individuals reason about moral issues. They propose that levels of idealism and relativism will affect the results of people's moral decisions. They found that people who scored highly on idealism judged unethical behavior more harshly, while relativism was uncorrelated with ethical judgment.

Another approach to examining individual's ethical decision-making is to see whether different philosophic approaches to ethics can be distilled into a multidimensional scale that shows differences among respondents and predicts their decisions. Reidenbach and Robin (1990) worked on just such a scale. Their original instrument included scales for the following philosophical approaches to ethics: justice, relative, egoist, utilitarian, and deontological. Upon testing the scale, they found three dimensions: moral equity, relativism, and contractualism. Hansen (1992) continued work on Reidenbach and Robin's (1990) scale and found a model "with four dimensions: a broad-based ethical judgment dimension, a deontological judgment dimension, a teleological judgment dimension, and a social contract dimension" (p. 523). Hansen suggests that the scale needs further refinement, because he found four components instead of three. However, he does not clearly address how he changed and adapted Reidenbach and Robin's (1990) scale. Cohen, Pant, and Sharp (1993) also examined Reidenbach and Robin's (1990) scale. They found different constructs than Reidenbach and Robin (1990) and Hansen (1992). They did not find a consistent number of factors across the scenarios they tested. Cohen, Pant, and Sharp suggest that differences in results may occur because the scale has been used to test different professions (p. 25). The results of this stream of research suggest that a priori defined ethical judgment systems may not match the schemata that people use to make ethical judgments. None of the studies found factors that were clearly related to the a priori philosophical categories used.

Strong and Meyer (1992) propose an "integrative, descriptive model of ethical decision making with special attention given to issues of measurement" (p. 89). They suggest an overarching model of managerial decision-making where managerial decision-making is influenced by environmental restraints, internal moral restraints, and internal rational restraints (p. 90). They specifically test the part of the model that deals with internal moral restraints. They test (but do not find support for) the theory that "greater moral development will be related to a higher social responsibility perception of firm conduct" (p. 90).

Component III

Component III is concerned with how subjects choose what value is most important in a particular decision situation. Values may be moral, aesthetic, religious, or monetary, etc. Studies that fit under this category have examined people's economic versus their ethical values (Barnett & Karson, 1987) and the value people put on their place in an organization as demonstrated through organizational dependence (Wahn, 1993).

Barnett and Karson (1987) test ideas about the relationship between values and decisions. They investigate
two primary values: economic and ethical. They wanted to see if predominantly economic values would predict an economic decision and if predominantly ethical values would predict ethical decisions. They found that people in four of five scenarios tended to choose what they had predefined as the ethical course of action. However, they found that, overall, the individual's subjective values were not good predictors of behavior. A major problem with the vignettes is that the subjects could only make one of two predefined choices which had been judged either economic or ethical. Some of the choices could have been interpreted differently; for example, someone could have chosen the course of action defined as economic, but have ethical reasons for his or her choice.

Wahn (1993) studied the relationship between organizational dependence (how dependent employees were on their organization) and pressures from the organization to perform unethically. She proposed, based on past research, that people who felt more dependent on their organization would be more likely to comply to requests for unethical behavior; her hypothesis was not supported. This study implicitly involves comparing subjects who value security (staying in the organization) with those who do not and compares this value to the likelihood they will comply with requests for unethical behavior. She may have had significant results had she weighed organizational dependence against the subjects' other values.

Gellerman (1986) explains poor ethical decisions based on four kinds of rationalizations of decisions. These rationalizations are that the decision "is not 'really' illegal or immoral; that it is in the individual's or corporation's best interest; that it will never be found out; or that because it helps the company the company will condone it" (p. 85). Gellerman's study primarily examines aspects of Component III: the rationalizations discussed generally express the individual's attempt to weigh ethical values against the individual's or corporation's interests. While the idea that people rationalize away poor ethical decisions is appealing, he only offers three case studies as examples of his ideas.

Numerous theories have been proposed that suggest how situational factors affect individuals' ethical decision-making. Most of these situational factors fit under Component III of Rest's Model in that environments may emphasize values that compete with the individual's moral values. Situational factors range from the large scale to the localized. Hosmer (1987) suggests that unethical behavior becomes institutionalized because of current structures of top management, the divisional structure of organization (corporations that are divided into competing business units), and strategic planning methods that emphasize meeting financial projections. Because of competition between different divisions for scarce resources within the corporation, managers are forced to make unethical decisions in order to avoid being seen by top management as a business unit that performs below average. While Hosmer (1987) offers anecdotal support, his article provides only a theoretical view of institutional factors that may lead people to make unethical choices. Similarly, Deetz (1992) argues that institutionalized managerialism allows people to detach themselves from their personal responsibility for their actions; "for many individuals ethics becomes reduced to the calculated risk of getting caught, and motivation is exchanged for rewards" (p. 323).
Jackall (1988) argues that "managers' rules for survival and success are at the heart of what might be called the bureaucratic ethic, a moral code that guides managers through all the dilemmas and vicissitudes that confront them in the big organization" (p. 4). He views bureaucracies as places where managers:

- knowledge is fragmented and secreted, where private agreements are the only real way to fashion trust in the midst of ongoing competition and conflict, where relationships with trusted colleagues constitute one's only means both of defense and opportunity, and where one knows, even coincidental association with a disaster can haunt one's career years later, keeping silent and covering for oneself and for one's fellows become not only possible but prudent, indeed virtuous, courses of action....The alert manager pays whatever obeisance is required to the ideological idols of the moment, but he keeps his eye fixed on what has to be done to meet external and organizational exigencies. (p. 133)

Jackall emphasizes that managers base their decisions on surviving in the corporation and creating the greatest advantage for themselves, whatever the ethical consequences. Because managers are often moved frequently, they can make decisions that look good in the short term. These decisions may cause great harm in the long term, but by the time the effects are felt, they will be gone from the unit (e.g., boosting profitability of a unit by postponing all repairs to infrastructure). The managers short term profit pushes them up the hierarchy, enhancing their survival and rewarding them for unethical decisions. This way of viewing one's progress, Jackall suggests, is institutionalized in the modern corporation by reward and promotion structures and the value of short term profitability. Jackall bases his work on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 143 managers in three companies.

Similarly, Reilly and Kyj (1990) imply that the system forces people to make bad choices. They argue that "business and economic principles have effectively rationalized the system with amoral definitions-systems without moral content" (p. 26) These systems include such things as using the language of money to discuss and justify most decisions. They further suggest that "business ethicists, in leaning too much toward the psychology of the individual, have tended to discount the structural power of systems to 'determine' individual behavior....The weight of this article suggests unequivocally that the problem of unethical behavior is not a people problem but a system problem of definition. People's behavior is merely the consequence of following the systems principles" (p. 26). Along the same lines, Jansen and von Glinow (1985) theorize that there are implicit rewards for unethical behavior, in spite of public statements and codes that disapprove of unethical decisions. These rewards, they argue, are part of the organization's system; "this reward system perspective views rewards and sanctions not only as direct determinants of the individual's definition of the situation, but as determinants of group norms, which also define the individual's situation" (p. 815). All of these situational factors are concerned with values that may outweigh the individual's moral values.
I found only one study in business ethics that examines the behaviors that result in ethical decision-making situations (Component IV). Laczniak and Inderrieden (1987) examine, in an in-basket study of 113 MBA students, the influence of stated organizational concern on ethical decisions, in an effort to study how organizational concern as expressed in organizational ethical codes affects individual decision-making. They note that their study is based on learning theory; they evaluate how changing the stimulus from the organization (from less to more specific instructions about the organization's expectations for ethical behavior) affects the manager's decision. They found that stated organizational concern only affected judgment on issues that included choosing illegal actions. People did not make significantly more ethical decisions when there was more stated organizational concern about ethics when the issue was simply a moral, and not a legal, issue.

Multiple Components

Ludwig and Longenecker (1993) suggest that when upper level managers violate ethical principles, it is because of their success. Success may cause the 'Bathsheba' syndrome, which causes leaders to lose strategic focus, gives them privileged access to information, people, goods, and time, and gives them "control of resources and inflated beliefs] in personal ability to control outcomes" (p. 269). In this scenario, interpretations of situations are influenced by the individual's perception of his or her influence over the outcomes of situations (Component I). The authors suggest the value of personal gratification (in many forms) may out weigh moral values (Component III). While an interesting article illustrated with the story of David and Bathsheba, only anecdotal evidence is offered to support their suppositions.

Using the Four-Component Model to organize studies provides a more comprehensive view of ethics in organizations. This schema points out where weaknesses are in current business ethics research. The most weaknesses exist in the research into sensitivity to ethical issues (Component I) and in carrying out ethical decisions (Component IV). More work needs to be done in Component II to determine what ethical values people use to make ethical judgments in businesses. More research into Component III factors would first have to determine the values held by people in business and then examine how people weigh ethical values against other values.

What methods might be appropriate for studying ethical sensitivity in organizations?

If we want to study people's ethical sensitivity, we need different methods than those currently used in business ethics' research. In this section of the paper I will examine the current state of research methods in business ethics. This includes a look at some of the problems associated with the use of questionnaires, the most common method for studying an individual's ethical judgments, and other problems associated with study design. I conclude by providing an alternative approach that may be more suitable for examining ethical sensitivity.

Two areas of concern exist about the current state of research methods in business ethics: the common use of
questionnaire research and problems associated with study design. Currently, there are problems with the way questionnaires are commonly used. In the majority of research designs, subjects are given vignettes that have an ethical dimension and then are forced to confront issues of right and wrong (Barnett, Bass, & Brown, 1994; Barnett & Karson, 1987; Barnett & Karson, 1989; Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993; Finegan, 1994; Hansen, 1992; Harris, 1990; Nelson & Obremski, 1990; Reidenbach & Robin, 1990; Strong & Meyer, 1992). Generally, the subjects are asked to choose an action that they would take (Barnett & Karson, 1987; Barnett & Karson, 1989; Nelson & Obremski, 1990; Strong & Meyer, 1992), rate the level of goodness/badness of decisions others have made (Barnett, Bass, & Brown, 1994; Finegan, 1994; Hansen, 1992; Harris, 1990), or are given categories from normative ethical theory on which to rank vignettes (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993; Hansen, 1992; Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). One problem with forcing respondents to confront issues of right or wrong is that respondents may never have thought of the decision scenarios in terms of ethics had the questionnaire not brought issues of right/wrong to the forefront. Schlacter (1990) notes that most research projects define situations in terms of ethics: “Researchers who seek to study the ethical sensitivity of their subjects and use leading questions will tend to prejudice outcomes....If ethical consciousness is the object of study, a procedure like this will bias the inquiry at the outset, and that data which result will only indicate a sensitivity to the experimenter’s demand” (p. 848). He goes on to suggest that interviews and other methods that do not directly confront subjects with moral decisions might provide more valid results.

A second problem with questionnaires is that the respondents can only see or respond to ethical issues or decision options that the researcher allows. Some issues may not be salient or significant to individuals; ethical categories based on normative ethical theories may not represent the way people other than philosophers schematize ethical issues. Limited decision options may not provide any realistic choices for individuals. The vignettes they use are a third problem. The vignettes are supposed to present realistic ethical decision making situations; however, most of the vignettes tend to provide simplistic representations of decision-making situations because of the limited length of questionnaires. They tend to allow the subject to choose one of two ethical solutions. The vignettes tend to be very concise, with none of the noise, other conflicting decisions, or stress that confront people in day-to-day decision making. On average, the published vignettes are 87 words long, which is shorter than the average product description in a Lands' End clothing catalog. (Averages taken from scenarios in Harris, 1990; Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993; Reidenbach & Robin, 1990; Barnett & Karson, 1987; Hansen, 1992; Barnett & Karson, 1989). Many of the deficiencies of questionnaire research could be balanced out by the performance of large-scale, interview-based research which allows for more open-ended responses from subjects.

The samples used in current research projects are a second concern. While sample sizes tend to be adequate subjects tend to be either students (undergraduate and MBA students) or managers, all highly educated people (see Table 1). Few studies examine the ethical decision-making of lower-level managers or non-managerial employees. Research into Kohlberg’s stage model suggests that the level of
education is the best predictor of moral development stage (Rest, 1986). Employees at all levels of an organization, including those without MBAs, may be faced with ethical dilemmas that will affect the organization. Research that includes people at lower levels of organizations would help us understand the ethical climate of the whole organization, not just those at the top.

Interviews are one method researchers can use to avoid setting up dilemmas as having primarily ethical/moral characteristics. Interviews have their drawbacks, however; gathering data from interviews tends to be less efficient that questionnaire data (c.f. Delaney & Sockell, 1992). Other problems, if the interview is completely open-ended, include: 1) lack of consistency across subjects, and 2) difficulty in empirically analyzing data[3]. When using data from any type of interview, you first have to decide on a unitizing rule (thought, sentence, response to interview question), to break the data down into codable units. After determining how to unitize, you need to decide what kind of method you will use to categorize your data. Content analysis is one method that allows you to categorize data, but it may not be appropriate for every situation. As Axelrod (1976, p. 7) notes, "even the most fully developed content analysis is still essentially a counting procedure with limited usefulness for analyzing the structure of the relationships between the concepts."

Cognitive mapping is one technique that could be used in the field of business ethics to make the analysis of interview data more systematic and quantifiable. It differs from content analysis in that it can show how subjects link categories together. Cognitive mapping is a technique developed by Axelrod (1976) to analyze policy decisions. (For a history of cognitive mapping, see Axelrod, 1976.) As with any map, cognitive maps are a symbolic representation of something. In geography, a map can be defined as, "a two-dimensional representation of all or part of earth's surface showing selected natural or human phenomena" (Oberlander & Miller, 1987, p. G12). Instead of drawing a physical feature or a characteristic of humans in relation to a land form, a cognitive map seeks to represent certain characteristics of a subject's thinking. In some cases, the researcher may wish to use cognitive maps to illustrate the subject's thinking about the strategic focus of the organization, or causal links between policy issues, or, as in this case, the links the subject makes between the characteristics of ethical sensitivity: situational characteristics, issues, stakeholders, and consequences.

It is useful to remember that cognitive mappings cannot capture everything that a subject says. Axelrod states that cognitive maps are mathematical models of belief systems (1976, p. 58). He says:

A mathematical model is a tremendous simplification of what it represents. But it does not simplify everything about its object, or there would be nothing left to model. Instead it simplifies everything that is not to be examined, and leaves in the model what is to be examined....the value of the model is not determined by how little it simplifies, but rather by how well it reflects those aspects of the object which it is designed to help study....It does not try to capture every aspect of a person's belief system. That would be a hopeless, and even
a worthless, task since it would leave us with something just as complicated as the original object.

While cognitive mapping has not been used by business ethics researchers, cognitive mapping techniques are frequently used in other areas of organization research. Bougon (1992), a proponent of cognitive mapping, states that there are two streams of research in organizations and strategy that use cognitive mapping; one stream examines change in social systems and the other examines organizational strategy (see also Langenfield-Smith, 1992). Software has been developed to analyze cognitive maps, consultants use cognitive mapping as a technique in organizational interventions, and executives are encouraged to use cognitive maps to plot organizational strategy.[4] These common uses of cognitive mapping in organizational settings are not, however, appropriate for examining ethical sensitivity. Laukkanen (1994) suggests some alternative uses for cognitive mapping include using mapping to "model a domain of reality, its entities and their interrelationships, as represented in the knowledge/belief base of respondents or of the researchers themselves" and "they are assumed to model. . .the cognitive structures of the respondents, called e.g., schemata, cognitive maps, or mental models" (p. 337)

In Axelrod's work, points represent the different ideas that a person expresses. Causal connections between points noted by the subject are signified by arrows. Points and arrows are the two most basic parts of cognitive maps. A more detailed discussion of other components of cognitive mapping will not be discussed because the adaptation of cognitive mapping used here is based on points and arrows, which will be discussed shortly.

When examining ethical sensitivity, particularly as defined in this paper, the researcher is more interested in the connections between categories than tracing causal connections. Axelrod (1976) suggests that cognitive maps can illustrate the limitations in people's thinking or their lack of sensitivity; he says, "limited rationality appears in policy settings not as a limited ability to solve problems, but rather as restrictions in types of problems that are even addressed" (p. 57). In Rarick, Lind, and Swenson-Lepper's (1995) recent case study of the ethical sensitivity of two television news viewers, their system of cognitive mapping allows the researcher to capture the subject's use of the important categories according to the definition of ethical sensitivity and it also allows the researcher to capture the subject's connections between situational characteristics, issues, consequences, and stakeholders. Aspects of the interviewees' responses to probes about the news stories are categorized by the researcher according to a coding rule system as situational characteristics, issues, stakeholders, and consequences; these become the points on the cognitive map. Any links the subject makes are noted as arrows. (For a more detailed discussion, see Rarick, Lind, & Swenson-Lepper's, 1995, paper.)

This use of cognitive mapping to evaluate ethical sensitivity demonstrates a good match between theory (aspects of Component I of Rest's Four-Component Model) and method. As Eden (1992) suggests, "The ability of a map to be a model of cognition depends mostly upon two characteristics of the mapping method: (1) the adequacy of
the cognitive theory which guides the modelling or representation technique and the extent to which that modelling technique is a good reflection of the theory; and (2) the method of elicitation of cognition" (p. 261).

While the definition of Component I, ethical sensitivity, which guides the mapping is adequate, the method used to elicit cognition may be problematic. First, as Axelrod (1976, p. 254) notes, "Some beliefs that are relevant to the subject at hand are also unstated. Sometimes this is because they are so obvious to the speaker and audience that they need not be made explicit." For example, in the Rarick et al. (1995) paper, news stories were used as stimuli for questions that probed ethical sensitivity. Both the researcher and the subject watched the tape; some subjects may have left information unspoken, even when questioned, because it seemed too obvious. A second problem with cognitive mapping of interview data is the relationship between the map, interview data, and the person's actual cognitive structures. Some have noted that cognitive maps are the researcher's representation of the interviewee's representations of his or her internal state, which in turn is the person's representation of something in the world. Cossette and Audet (1992, p. 327) say that "a cognitive map is a graphic representation of a set of discursive representations made by a subject with regards to an object in the context of a particular interaction. It is not intended to reflect that which is in the head of the subject: and even if it could, we have no sure way of validating it." We cannot know that the map we have drawn is an accurate account of the schema that occur in another's brain. Further, the maps are influenced by the subject's context, be it the interview context or the context of the type of day the person is having.

While these are serious concerns about using cognitive mapping to analyze interview data, these problems exist any time words (written or spoken) are used to stand for people's cognitions. Until we can download data about schemata directly from the human brain and until human schema remain uninfluenced by interaction input from other sources, and cognitive development and changes, we will have to continue using error producing methods that involve human communication. (See also Axelrod, p. 252)

In organizational communication, what questions could we answer using the construct of ethical sensitivity?

In the field of organizational communication, there are at least three types of questions that can be answered using the construct of ethical sensitivity. First, on a methodological level, communication competence is a variable that may affect an ethical sensitivity score. Because ethical sensitivity has thus far been examined through interviews (Rarick, Lind, & Swenson-Lepper, 1995) or by having people respond to scenarios verbally (e.g., Bebeau, 1994) oral communication competence may unduly affect ethical sensitivity scores.

Second, on a theoretical level, researchers could examine if organizational communication factors influence ethical sensitivity. Socialization, formal and informal communication, special consciousness raising campaigns (e.g., about sexual harassment), organizational myths and rituals, ethical codes, and professionalization are all communication variables that have the potential to affect ethical sensitivity.
Third, ethical sensitivity could be examined in relation to communication ethics issues. Many of the big issues in business ethics involve communication. These include whistleblowing and issues related to veracity (exaggeration, withholding information, avoiding fraud, etc.). For example, researchers could investigate how supervisors handle performance reviews when employees are performing poorly, how sales people deal with exaggerated, but not false, information about a product, or if employees tell a customer that less expensive materials have been substituted in a product in a way that does not affect the product's performance. Accounting personnel may be asked to leave information out or give information a spin that is desired by management. Support personnel, like secretaries or administrative assistants, face issues such as lying for their supervisors and leaving out information in reports and correspondence. Line personnel may be asked directly or indirectly to approve products that they know are not adequate. Communication issues like verbal sexual harassment cut across all levels of organizations. There are a wealth of communication issues that affect employees at all levels of an organizations; these issues should be of interest to those of us who want to study ethics, ethical sensitivity, and organizational communication.

Endnotes

[1] Kohlberg (1976, p. 48) notes that there are other founding persons for cognitive developmental moral theory; Piaget is the most commonly noted. Please see Kohlberg for more details about the lineage of cognitive-developmental moral theory.

[2] This model has been the predominant model of cognitive moral development for the past 35 years. After continuous study, Kohlberg and his study group have dropped Stage 6 from their snug manual (Rest, 1983, p. 575), because Stage 6 is rarely found. Most U.S. citizens tend to be at Stage 4, of the conventional stage. (Rest, 1983, p. 591). While this model has been predominant, people do disagree with the model in many ways. See Lifton (1986) for references to psychoanalytic challenges to this model. See Casey & Burton (1986) for references to social-learning theory challenges to this model. While still in the cognitive-development field, Gilligan (1982, Gilligan, Ward & Taylor, 1988) challenges the model's emphasis on an ethic of justice. While her work has been very popular, Rest (1994) points out that there is minimal evidence to support her suppositions. This controversy, while interesting, is outside of the realm of this paper. For more details about this controversy, see Rest (1994).


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